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Resumo
O artigo tem o objetivo de analisar a questão do casa-
mento igualitário nos Estados Unidos, dando especial 
enfoque para o caso Obergefell v. Hodges, no qual a 
Suprema Corte norte-americana decidiu, em junho de 
2015, por maioria de 5 votos a 4, pela inconstituciona-
lidade da proibição do casamento entre pessoas do 
mesmo sexo. Além disso, analisa a jurisprudência da 
Suprema Corte sobre temas relacionados a essa discus-
são e o movimento democrático ocorrido nos Estados 
norte-americanos nos últimos anos sobre o casamento 
homossexual, demonstrando todo o caminho percorrido 
para que se chegasse à decisão tomada em Obergerfell. 
Por fim, destaca algumas possíveis repercussões que o 
caso pode gerar em outras questões atinentes ao casa-
mento igualitário.
Palavras-chave: caso Obergefell; casamento igualitário; 
casamento homossexual; igualdade; Estados Unidos.
Abstract
The article aims to analyze the marriage equality in the 
United States, with a special focus at Obergefell v. Hodges 
case, in which the US Supreme Court held, in June 2015, in 
a 5-4 decision that is unconstitutional to forbid same-sex 
marriage. Furthermore, it analyzes the Supreme Court juris-
prudence about some issues related to this discussion and 
the democratic movement in the states in favor of same-sex 
marriage in the years leading up to Obergefell. Lastly, it 
makes some modest observations about the case and the 
larger issue of gay marriage in the United States.
Keywords: Obergefell; marriage equality; same-sex mar-
riage; equality; United States.
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1. InTROdUCTIOn
On June 26, 2015, as millions prepared to celebrate gay pride events in the Unit-
ed States and around the world, the Supreme Court of the United States announced its 
much-anticipated decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.1  As is now well known, the Supreme 
Court, in a closely divided opinion, held that same-sex couples have a right to marry un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.2  This decision prompted vitupera-
tive dissents from the four most conservative justices on the Court and both effusive 
praise and abject criticism from scholars and the public at-large.  
This article discusses the Obergefell decision and more broadly the underlying is-
sue of same-sex marriage in the United States.  Part 2 explores the Court’s jurisprudence 
1  576 U.S. ___ (2015).  Citations in this paper to Obergefell will be to the Slip Opinion (slip op.), available on the 
official webpage of the Supreme Court of the United States at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14p-
df/14-556_3204.pdf.
2  As noted in Part 4.6., infra, it is not entirely clear whether the Court found a constitutional right to marriage 
or merely to marriage equality.
Marriage equality in the United States: a look at Obergefell and beyond
9Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 1, p. 7-41, jan./abr. 2016.
underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell and the democratic movement 
in the states in favor of same-sex marriage in the years leading up to Obergefell; Part 3 
explains the majority decision and dissenting opinions in Obergefell; and Part 4 makes 
some modest observations about the case and the larger issue of gay marriage in the 
United States.
2. JURISPRUdenTIal and legal BaCkgROUnd
In order to fully understand Obergefell, it is important to explore the historical 
background of some of the major themes underlying the legal analysis in the Court’s 
decision.  This includes (A) the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence and cases 
involving the right to marry and the rights of gay individuals (involving sexual intimacy, 
political power, and marriage); and (B) the recent democratic movement in favor of 
permitting same-sex marriage.
2.1.  Judicial decisions Underlying the decision in Obergefell
As discussed in detail below,3 the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell rested 
largely 
on constitutional due process protections and the fundamental nature of the 
right to marry.  As such, this decision drew heavily on a number of earlier Court prec-
edents involving several interrelated issues – the right to liberty in matters relating to 
sexual intimacy, procreation, and decisions relating to family, as well as a series of cases 
on marriage and the rights of gay men and lesbians to engage in private consensual 
sexual activity and to exercise political rights.
The evolution of the law with regard to marriage, sexual liberty, gay rights, and 
related matters is best understood through a chronological recitation of the most im-
portant cases on these issues, as set forth below.
2.1.1. Early Substantive Due Process Cases
The Supreme Court’s early substantive due process cases on matters relating to 
liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment provide an essential backdrop for 
the Court’s more recent decisions on marriage and sexual intimacy.  These include Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (permitting the teaching of modern foreign languages 
to children during times of peace); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters4 (affirming a parent’s right to 
direct the education of his or her child); Griswold v. Connecticut5 (acknowledging a right 
3  See Part 3, infra.
4  268 U.S. 510 (1925).
5  381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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to privacy in the marital bedroom in the context of the use of contraceptives); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird6 (recognizing that non-married people have a constitutional right to use 
contraceptives); Roe v. Wade7 (establishing a woman’s right, with certain limitations, to 
obtain an abortion);  Carey v. Population Servs.8 (permitting minors to obtain access to 
contraceptives); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey9 (affirm-
ing the essential holding of Roe v. Wade).
2.1.2. Miscegenation Laws Struck Down
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia.10 
Mildred and Richard Loving, an interracial married couple living in their native state of 
Virginia, were indicted for violating Virginia’s ban on miscegenation.  The Lovings chal-
lenged Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924 as infringing their rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution.11  The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the 
law violated both the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
2.1.3. Claim to Marriage Equality Found Not to Present Substantial Federal Question
Four years later in Baker v. Nelson a gay couple in Minnesota challenged the 
denial of a marriage license, claiming that the denial deprived them of their due pro-
cess, equal protection, and privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Both the 
district court and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the limitation of marriage to 
heterosexual couples.12 The case went to the Supreme Court of the United States under 
mandatory appeal, but the Court dismissed the appeal “for want of a substantial federal 
question.”13  The Supreme Court explicitly overruled Baker in Obergefell.14
2.1.4. Sodomy Laws Upheld
In another disappointment for gay-rights advocates, the Supreme Court 
in the 1986 decision Bowers v. Hardwick15 upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia 
6  405 U.S. 438 (1972).
7  410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8  431 U.S. 678 (1977).
9  505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
10  388 U.S. 1 (1967).
11  The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, inter alia, prohibits the government from “depriv[ing] 
any person of life. Liberty, or property” or “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”  
12  Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
13  Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
14  Obergefell, slip op. at 23.
15  Bowers v. Harwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Marriage equality in the United States: a look at Obergefell and beyond
11Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 1, p. 7-41, jan./abr. 2016.
statute criminalizing sodomy against claims that the law violated the petitioner’s Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process.16
2.1.5. State Law Invalidated for Animus Toward Gay People
The tide seemed to turn modestly in favor of recognizing gay rights when, ten 
years later, the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans17 struck down an amendment to the 
Colorado constitution that would have prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial ac-
tion at any level of state or local government designed to protect … homosexual persons or 
gays and lesbians.”18 Noting that the amendment imposed a “broad and undifferentiated 
disability on a single named group,”19 the Court rejected the notion that the “bare … desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group,” constituted a legitimate governmental interest that 
could justify the action.20  
2.1.6. Same Sex Marriage Issue Reemerges in the States and Congress Responds with the 
Defense of Marriage Act
Also in the 1990s, the issue of same-sex marriage re-emerged, this time in Ha-
waii.  Three same-sex couples argued that the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage 
violated the Hawaiian constitution.  In the course of the somewhat protracted history of 
this case, the Supreme Court of Hawaii found that denying marriage licenses to same-
sex couples constituted discrimination under the state constitution and that such ac-
tion could be upheld only if the state could demonstrate that denying marriage licens-
es to gay couples “furthers compelling state interests” and that the proscription was 
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.”21  During 
the pendency of the case, Hawaii’s constitution was amended to prohibit gay marriage, 
leading to a dismissal of the case in 1999.  
The decision nevertheless set off a spate of statewide legislation and constitu-
tional amendments across the country banning gay marriages.  At the federal level, 
Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 
1996.22  DOMA provided that same-sex marriages properly celebrated at the state level 
would not be recognized by the federal government.23
16  The Supreme Court later overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.  See Part 2.1.8., infra.
17  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
18  Id. at 624.
19  Id. at 632.
20  Id. at 634-35.
21  Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993), reconsideration and clarification granted in part, 74 Haw. 645, 
852 P.2d 74 (1993).
22  Pub.L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (September 21, 1996).
23  DOMA was later declared unconstitutional in Windsor v. United States.  See Part II.A. 10., infra.
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2.1.7. Vermont Requires Same-Sex Couples to Receive Same Benefits as Married Couples
Despite these setbacks in many states and at the federal level, the Vermont Su-
preme Court in 1999 ruled that the state was required to extend to same-sex couples 
all of the benefits and protections of marriage under state law.24  The court ordered 
the Vermont legislature either to allow same-sex marriage or implement an alternative 
mechanism to provide similar benefits to gay couples.
2.1.8. Supreme Court Reverses Course and Finds that State Laws Criminalizing Sodomy 
Violates Due Process
A watershed decision came in 2003 with Lawrence v. Texas,25 in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States overturned its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick and held 
that laws criminalizing sodomy denied people of their liberty interests and thus vio-
lated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2.1.9. More Marriage Cases Reach the States with Mixed Outcomes
Gay couples continued to bring cases to the state courts arguing for marriage 
equality, with varied but promising results.  In 2003, the same year that Lawrence v. Tex-
as was decided, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that same-sex couples 
have the right to marry under the state constitution.26  Just a few years later, same-sex 
petitioners in New York were less successful, as the New York Court of Appeals rejected 
similar claims.27  Also in 2006, an intermediate result was announced by the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey, which ruled that the state constitution mandated that same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples were entitled to the same rights and benefits but that they 
did not necessarily need to be conferred through the institution of marriage.28  The 
California courts, however, joined the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in holding 
that a state statute and initiative limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the 
state constitution.29  The Supreme Court of Iowa followed in 2009, finding that refusal 
to issue marriage licenses to gay couples violated the equal protection clause of the 
state constitution.30
24  Baker v. Vermont, 744 A. 2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
25  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
26  Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
27  Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y. 338, 855 N.E. 2d 1 (2006).
28  Lewis v. Harris, 188 N. J. 415, 908 A. 2d 196 (2006).
29  In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
30  Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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2.1.10. Federal Defense of Marriage Act Invalidated by Supreme Court
Another seminal moment for gay rights advocates was the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in United States v. Windsor,31 in which the Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional provisions of DOMA that barred the federal government from recognizing same-
sex marriages.  In a companion case, the Court declined to rule whether there was a 
federal constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, finding that the petitioners 
lacked standing to bring the appeal.32
2.2.  The democratic Movement Toward Same-Sex Marriage
An important context to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell is the strong 
social movement in favor of same-sex marriage and acceptance of gay people more 
generally over the preceding decade or so.  The impact of the robust public dialogue 
and social movement in favor of same-sex marriage was a source of disagreement 
between the Justices in the majority and the dissenters in Obergefell.33  But all agree 
that the democratic movement was moving in the direction of marriage equality – and 
moving quickly in that direction.  This is perhaps best evidenced by public opinion 
polls34 and by legislation in eleven states and the District of Columbia legalizing same-
sex marriage.35
3. The ObErgEfEll deCISIOn
The Supreme Court announced its much-awaited decision in Obergefell on June 
26, 2015, by a narrow vote of 5-4.  As is now widely known, the Supreme Court in Oberg-
fell held that the due process clause of the Constitution, coupled with the equal pro-
tection clause, provides same-sex couples the right to marry.  As the Court concluded:
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and un-
der the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples 
of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds 
that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this 
liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State 
31  United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
32  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013).
33  Compare Obergefell, slip op. at 23 – 25 with, e.g., Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts at 9.
34  See, e.g., http://www.pewforum.org/2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage 
(showing, among other things, steady increase in support for gay marriage since 20014).
35  These states are Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Washington.  See Obergefell, Appendix B, slip op at 34.  See Obergefell, dissenting opinion 
of Chief Justice Roberts, slip op. at 9.
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laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they ex-
clude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as op-
posite sex couples.36
The sections that follow explain (A) the constellation of the Justices in Oberge-
fell, (B) the facts underlying Obergefell, (C) the procedural history of the case, (D) the 
majority opinion, and (E) the dissenting opinions.
3.1.  The Constellation of the Justices
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Kennedy and joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.  Chief Justice Roberts and associate 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito issued dissenting opinions.  For the most part, this 
alignment was not in the least bit surprising:  Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan form the Court’s progressive branch and were widely expected to find a 
constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry, while the Court’s most conservative 
justices – Chief Justice Roberts and Scalia, Thomas, and Alito – were expected to find 
that there was no such right.  
The only open question for most observers37 was how Justice Kennedy, the 
Court’s swing voter, would come down on the issue.  On the one hand, Justice Ken-
nedy is a fundamentally conservative Justices who typically favors states rights in cases 
involving federalism concerns.  On the other hand, Justice Kennedy had proven himself 
even before Obergefell to be a staunch defender of the right to liberty in matters of 
intimacy and had authored the Court’s previous cases extending rights to gay men and 
lesbian – Romer v. Evans,38 Lawrence v. Texas,39 and Windsor v. United States.40  Ultimately, 
of course, Justice Kennedy found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, enhanc-
ing even further his stature as a champion of gay rights.
36  Obergefell, slip op. at 22-23.
37  Some believed that some or even all of the Court’s most conservative Justices, including Chief Justice Ro-
berts, would vote in favor of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.  See, e.g., ZORN, Eric. A 9-0 Supreme 
Court ruling for gay marriage? 10-4. Chicago Tribune (May 1, 2015), available at: <http://www.chicagotribu-
ne.com/news/opinion/zorn/ct-gay-marriage-supreme-court-same-sex-perspec-0503-jm-20150501-column.
html>; LANDAU, Joseph. Why Chief Justice John Roberts Might Support Gay Marriage. The new York Times 
(April 27, 2015), available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/opinion/why-chief-justice-john-roberts-
might-support-gay-marriage.html?_r=0>.
38  188 N. J. 415, 908 A. 2d 196 (2006).
39  539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40  133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
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3.2.  Facts in Obergefell
The decision in Obergefell was based on a number of consolidated cases that 
included the following petitioners:
Obergefell, who wanted to marry his longtime partner, Arthur, after Arthur fell ill 
with a debilitating, progressive illness.  Same-sex marriage was not permitted in their 
home state of Ohio, so they traveled to Maryland in a medical transport plane.  Because 
it was difficult for Arthur to move, they married on the plane as it remained on the tar-
mac in Baltimore.  Arthur died three months later.  Ohio law did not permit Obergefell 
to be listed as the surviving spouse on the death certificate.41
DeBoer and Rowse are two women with three children, two with special needs. 
Each child can have only one legal parent because their home state of Michigan per-
mits only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to adopt.  Among other 
things, if one were to die, the surviving partner would have no legal rights over the 
child(ren) she had not been permitted to adopt.  “This couple seeks relief from the con-
tinuing uncertainty their unmarried status creates in their lives.”42
DeKoe and Kostura, two men, married in New York one week before DeKoe was 
deployed for military service in Afghanistan.  Their marriage was not recognized in Ten-
nessee, where DeKoe works full-time for the Army Reserve.  “Their lawful marriage is 
stripped from them whenever they reside in Tennessee, returning and disappearing as 
they travel across state lines.”43
These and other cases formed the factual background for the decision in 
Obergefell.
3.3.  Procedural history
The consolidated cases in Obergefell came from the states of Kentucky, Michi-
gan, Ohio, and Tennessee, all of which did not permit same-sex couples to marry.  Pe-
titioners claimed that the respondent states “violated the Fourteenth Amendment by 
denying them the right to marry or have their marriages, lawfully performed in another 
State, given full recognition.”44
The district courts all ruled in favors of petitioners.45  Respondents appealed 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  The Court of Appeals con-
solidated the cases and reversed the district courts, finding no constitutional right to 
41  Obergefell, slip op. at 4-5.
42  Obergefell, slip op. at 5.
43  Obergefell, slip op. at 6.
44  Obergefell, slip op. at 2.
45  Id.
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license same-sex marriages or recognize such marriages lawfully performed in other 
states.46  Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
In granting the writ of certiorari,47 the Supreme Court agreed to decide the fol-
lowing issues:
1. “[Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage 
between two people of the same sex.”
2. “[W]hether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a 
same-sex marriage license performed in a State which does grant that 
right.”48
3.4.  The Majority Opinion
3.4.1. History and Background of Marriage and the Struggle for Equality
The majority opinion begins with the recognition of the importance of marriage 
as an institution:
From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the 
transcendent importance of marriage.  The lifelong union of a man and a woman al-
ways has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in 
life.  Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religion and offers unique fulfillment to 
those who find meaning in the secular realm.  Its dynamic allows two people to find a life 
that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. 
Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound 
hopes and aspirations.49
From this the Court concluded that “[n]o union is more profound that marriage, 
for it embodies the highest ideal of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.  In form-
ing a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were.”50
The Court discussed at some length the history and evolution of the institution 
of marriage, observing that “[t]he centrality of marriage to the human condition makes 
it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations.”51 
Despite its longevity, the Court recognized that “[t]he history of marriage is one of both 
46  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014)
47  The writ of certiorari is the procedural device used by the Supreme Court to exercise its discretionary appella-
te jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1254 and 1257.
48  Obergefell, slip op. at 2-3.
49  Id., slip op. at 3.
50  Id., slip op. at 28.
51  Id., slip op. at 3.
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continuity and change.”52  The Court then chronicled some of the changes that have 
marked the history of the institution.  Noting that marriage was once viewed as an 
arrangement made by a couple’s parents based on political, religious, and financial 
considerations,53 marriage later came to be understood as a voluntary contract be-
tween a man and a woman.54  And while women once remained non-legal persons 
upon marriage, they later gained legal, political, and property rights, both in and out-
side of marriage.55  Such changes, the Court observed, have “worked deep transforma-
tions in the structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essential.”56
These changes to our common understanding of marriage, the Court conclud-
ed, were typical of movements for greater freedoms that mark U.S. history:  
These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage.  In-
deed, changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new di-
mensions of freedom became apparent to new generations, often through perspectives 
that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the 
judicial process.57
The Court also summarized the history of the movement for equality by the gay 
and lesbian community in the United States – a movement that had made remarkable 
progress in recent years.  Until relatively recently, “same-sex intimacy had long been 
condemned as immoral by the state itself in most Western nations,” a belief that was 
codified in the criminal laws of many states.58  Discrimination abounded well beyond 
the criminal law context; homosexuals in the U.S. were “prohibited from most govern-
ment employment, barred from military service, excluded under immigration laws, tar-
geted by police, and burdened in their rights to associate.”59  Indeed, homosexuality 
was treated as an illness for most of the 20th century, and classified as a mental disorder 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1952).60
It was only late in the 20th Century that gay individuals began to lead more open 
and public lives and to establish families.  “This development was followed by a quite 
52  Id., slip op. at 6.
53  Id.
54  Id.
55  Id. at 6.




60  Id. at 7.
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extensive discussion of the issue on both governmental and private sectors and by a 
shift in public attitudes toward greater tolerance.”61
3.4.2. Marriage as a Protected Right under the Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court began its legal analysis by reaffirming the judicial role in de-
fining and protecting liberty interests under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”62  The liberty interests protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment are nowhere defined but, the Court affirmed, “extend[] to certain 
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choic-
es that define personal identify and beliefs.”63
And it remains an important judicial obligation to determine and protect those 
liberty interests:  “The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an endur-
ing part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.”64  This duty
requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so 
fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.  That process is guided by 
many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisos 
that set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements.  History and tradition 
guide this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.65
The Court also invoked the notion of the Constitution as a living document, 
whose meaning evolves over time as we as a society mature:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The genera-
tions that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted 
to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we 
learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central 
protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.66
61  Id. at 8.
62  Constitution of the United States, Amendment 14.
63  Obergefell, slip op. at 10.
64  Id.
65  Id. at 10-11, citations omitted.
66  Id. at 11.
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The Court, citing its decision in Loving v. Virginia,67 noted its longstanding de-
termination that “the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.”68  In Loving, a 
unanimous Supreme Court held that marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”69  This principle, the Court stated, 
had been reaffirmed in numerous cases:  “Over time and in [several] contexts, the Court 
has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.” 70
The Court acknowledged that the right to marry had always been recognized 
in cases involving opposite-sex partners but found that this was simply a reflection of 
the times:  “The Court, like many institutions, has made assumptions defined by the 
world and time of which it is a part.”71  The Court noted that in its precedents the Court 
“expressed constitutional principles of broader reach.”72  The Court continued by ob-
serving that “in assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex 
couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long 
protected.”73
The Court’s analysis thus led it to the conclusion that same-sex couples have 
the constitutional right to marry, identifying four principles and traditions which “dem-
onstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with 
equal force to same-sex couples.”74  These four principles and traditions, each of which 
is discussed below, are the following:
a. Notions of individual autonomy
b. The importance and uniqueness of marriage
c. The need to protect children and families
d. Marriage as a bedrock of society
3.4.2.1. Notions of Individual Autonomy
The first principle on which the Court based its finding that the Constitution re-
quires marriage equality was founded on notions of individual autonomy, drawn from 
the Court’s conclusion that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent 
in the concept of individual autonomy.”75 “Like choices concerning contraception, fam-
ily relationships, procreation, and childbearing, all of which are protected by the Consti-
67  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see Part 2.1.2., supra.
68  Obergefell, slip op. at 11.
69  Loving, 388 U.S. at 12, quoted in slip op. at 11, 12.
70  Obergefell, slip op. at 11.
71  Id. at 11-12. 
72  Id. at 12.
73  Id. at 12.  
74  Id. 
75  Id.
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tution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual 
can make.” 76
Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny. …  The nature of marriage is that, 
through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as ex-
pression, intimacy, and spirituality….  There is dignity in the bond between two men or 
two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.77
3.4.2.2. The Importance and Uniqueness of Marriage
The second principle upon which the Court premised its finding that there is a 
fundamental right to marriage that extends to gay couples is the extraordinary impor-
tance and uniqueness of the institution of marriage.  Marriage, the Court said, supports 
a “two-person union unlike any other in its importance to committed individuals.”78  The 
Court recalled its language in Griswold about the significance of this institution:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate 
to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; 
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social proj-
ect.  Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.79
In expanding the right of marriage to the Obergefell petitioners, the Court also 
evoked its holding in Lawrence extending the right of intimate association to same-sex 
couples.80
3.4.2.3. The Need to Protect Children and Families
Third, the Court held that marriage protects children and families and for that 
reason 
should be extended to gay couples.  In safeguarding children and families, 
marriage “thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education.”81  These protections involve both material benefits associated with mar-
riage but also the integrity of the family unit.82  Justice Kennedy took note of the 
76  Id.
77  Id.
78  Id. at 13.
79  Id. at 13-14, quoting Griswold at 486.
80  Id. at 14.
81  Id. at 14.
82  Id. at 15.
Marriage equality in the United States: a look at Obergefell and beyond
21Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 1, p. 7-41, jan./abr. 2016.
modern reality that many gay couples have children and that these families and their 
children would benefit from the stability that marriage offers:
[M]any same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether 
biological or adopted.  And hundreds of thousands of children are presently being raised 
by such couples.  Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individ-
uals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents.  This 
provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create liv-
ing, supportive families.
* * * *
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with the central premise of the 
right to marry.  Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer 
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents. Relegated through 
no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.  The marriage laws at 
issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.83
At the same time, the Court was careful to debunk the notion that the right to 
marry is 
tied too closely to procreation – one of the principle arguments of the oppo-
nents of a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry:
This is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot 
have children.  An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a pre-
requisite for a valid marriage in any State.  In light of precedent protecting the right of 
a married couple not to procreate, it cannot be said that the Court or the States have 
conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commitment to procreate.  The consti-
tutional marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.84
3.4.2.4. Marriage as a Bedrock of Society 
Finally, the Court relied on the notion that “the Court’s cases and the Nation’s tra-
ditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”85  Indeed, the Court 
in earlier cases had described marriage as “the foundation of the family and of society, 
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress,”86 and as “a great public 
83  Id. (citations omitted).
84  Id. 15-16.
85  Id. at 16.  
86  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888), quoted in Obergefell, slip op. at 16.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 1, p. 7-41, jan./abr. 2016.
Toni Jaeger-Fine
22 
institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.”87  “Marriage,” the Court said in 
Obergefell, today “remains a building block of our national community.”88  When gay 
couples are excluded from marriage, they are “denied the constellation of benefits that 
the States have lined to marriage,”89 and “consigns [such couples] to an instability many 
opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.” 90
The exclusion of gay couples from the institution of marriage is also demeaning 
to those couples.  
As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it attaches 
to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are un-
equal in important respects.  It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out 
of a central institution of the Nation’s society.91
Again evoking the notion of a living Constitution, the Court said as follows:
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and 
just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry 
is now manifest.  With that knowledge must come the recognition that laws excluding 
same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohib-
ited by our basic charter.92
The majority rejected the argument raised by respondents that precedent com-
pelled the Court to consider liberty interests under the due process clause in a more 
circumscribed manner consistent with specific historical purposes.  Respondents made 
the argument that petitioners were not seeking to enter the existing institution of mar-
riage but to create a new, dramatically different, institution.  The Court demurred not-
ing that such an argument
is inconsistent with the approach this court has used in discussing other fundamental 
rights, including marriage and intimacy.  Loving did not ask about a right to “inter-racial 
marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki did not 
ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.”  Rather, each 
87  125 U.S. at 213, quoted in Obergefell at slip op. at 16.
88  Obergefell, slip op. at 16. 
89  Id. at 1.
90  Id. at 17.
91  Id. at 17.
92  Id. at 17-18.  “The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from 
ancient sources alone.  They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives 
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”  Id. at 18-19.
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case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a 
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.
* * * * 
That principle applies here.  If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then 
received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could 
not invoke rights once denied.  This Court has rejected that approach, both with respect 
to the right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.93
3.4.3. The Right to Marriage Under the Equal Protection Clause 
Although the centerpiece of the Court’s legal analysis was premised on a due 
process analysis, the Supreme Court found that equal protection considerations also 
supported its ruling that same-sex partners be permitted to marry:  “The right of same-
sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment 
is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”94 
Noting that earlier marriage cases, including Loving and Zablocki, had recognized the 
“synergistic influence” of due process on equal protection,95 the Court found that equal 
protection provided an additional ground for the right to marry in his case:
Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different 
precedents and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instance each may be instruc-
tive as to the meaning and reach of the other.  In any particular case one Clause may be 
thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, 
even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. 
This interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is 
and must become.96
As it did in its due process analysis, the Supreme Court again summoned a living 
approach to constitutional analysis:  “[I]n interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court has recognized that new insights and  societal understandings can reveal unjus-
tified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed 
and unchallenged.”97  In exposing the marriage laws under review to equal protection 
93  Id. at 18, citations omitted.
94  Id. at 19.  
95  Id. at 20.  See also id. at 22, noting that the Court in Lawrence “acknowledged the interlocking nature of these 
constitutional safeguards in the context of a legal treatment of gays and lesbians.”
96  Id. at 19.
97  Id.
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scrutiny, the Court concluded that refusing to allow same-sex marriage did not pass 
muster:
Here the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex 
couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from 
exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their 
relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and 
continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to dis-
respect and subordinate them.  And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process 
Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.98
3.4.4. Refutation of Arguments by Respondents
The respondent states made the following arguments, each of which were re-
jected by the Court:
a. Petitioners should wait for the social movement in favor of gay marriage to 
take its course;
b. Allowing gay marriage would harm the institution; and
c. Finding a constitutional right to gay marriage would conflict with the right 
to free exercise of religion.
Each of these arguments and the Court’s responses is discussed below.
3.4.4.1. Petitioners should wait for the social movement in favor of gay marriage to take its 
course
Respondents argued that the Court should refrain from finding a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage and instead let the social movement in favor of gay mar-
riage run its course through normal democratic processes.  This was one of the bases 
of the underlying court of appeals decisions.99  The argument contended that there 
had been “insufficient democratic discourse” to justify a full and final resolution of the 
issue; the Supreme Court countered that the issue of a right to same-sex marriage has 
received more deliberation than opponents acknowledge, and thus that the issue is 
ripe for judicial resolution.100 
98  Id. at 22.
99  Id. at 23.
100  Id.  As the Court stated:
There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, pa-
pers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings.  There has been extensive litigation in state and federal 
courts…. [Many] of the central institutions in American life – state and local governments, the military, large 
and small businesses, labor unions, religious organizations, law enforcement, civil groups, professional orga-
nizations and universities – have devoted substantial attention to the question.  This has led to an enhanced 
Marriage equality in the United States: a look at Obergefell and beyond
25Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 1, p. 7-41, jan./abr. 2016.
The Court did acknowledge that political change is often more productive than 
decisions involving judicial fiat, recognizing that “the Constitution contemplates that 
democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that process does not 
abridge fundamental rights.”101 The Court cited a recent case in which it noted that the 
“right of citizens to debate so that they can learn and decide and then, through the 
political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of their own times.”102  But 
in that case the Court also acknowledged that when the democratic process impinges 
individual rights, the courts have a legitimate and critical role.  “Thus, when the rights of 
persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires redress by the courts,’ notwithstanding 
the more general value of democratic decisionmaking.”103  “This holds true,” the Court 
continued, “even when protecting individual rights affects issues of the utmost impor-
tance and sensitivity.”104
The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative 
action before asserting a fundamental right…. An individual can invoke a right to con-
stitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees 
and even if the legislature refuses to act.  The idea of the Constitution “was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by 
the courts.”  West Virginia Bd. of Ed. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). …. “It is of no 
moment whether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or lack momentum in the 
democratic process.105
The Court further noted the harm that can emerge from a more restrained, cau-
tious approach, as the Court took in Bowers, which was ultimately repudiated by the 
Court in Lawrence v. Texas:
A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect – and, like Bowers, would 
be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The petitioners’ stories make clear the 
urgency of the issue they present to the Court. … [T]he Court has a duty to address these 
claims and answer these questions…. Were the Court to stay its hand to allow slower, 
case-by-case determination of the required availability of specific public benefits to 
understanding of the issue – an understanding reflected in he arguments now presented for resolution as a 
matter of constitutional law.  
Id. at 23-24.
101  Id. at 24.
102  Id., quoting Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U.S. ___ (2014), slip op. 15-16.
103  Id., quoting Schuette at slip op. 17. 
104  Id.
105  Id. at 24-25.
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same-sex couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many rights and responsibilities 
intertwined with marriage.106
3.4.4.2. Allowing gay marriage would harm the institution
A longstanding argument against allowing same-sex couples to marry is that 
doing so would undermine the sanctity of the institution.  In particular, the argument 
was advanced that marriage exists to foster the “natural connection between natural 
procreation and marriage”107 and thus is not suited to gay couples.  The Court reject-
ed this argument because it “rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couple’s 
decision-making process regarding marriage and parenthood,” with the desire to have 
children being only one of “many personal, romantic, and practical considerations.”108  
An additional argument has been made that allowing same-sex couples to 
marry would deter heterosexual couples from marrying because it would taint the in-
stitution.  The Court also rejected this argument, finding that “it is unrealistic to con-
clude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex 
couples may do so.”109 
3.4.4.3. Finding a constitutional right to gay marriage would conflict with the right to free 
exercise of religion
Respondents and others argued that finding a constitutional right of same-sex 
couples to marry would conflict with the right to the free exercise of religion guaran-
teed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  The Court rejected this argu-
ment, insisting that “religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may con-
tinue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex 
marriage should not be condoned.”110 
3.4.5. Full Faith and Credit Applies to Same-Sex Marriages
The so-called full faith and credit clause of the Constitution provides as follows:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the 
106  Id. at 25-26.  As the Solicitor General said during oral argument, a cautious approach would be “a validation” 
of the constitutionality of marriage discrimination laws.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, page 29, line 7, avai-
lable at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-556q1_l5gm.pdf.
107  Obergefell, slip op. at 26.
108  Id.
109  Id.
110  Id. at 27.
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manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect 
thereof.111
Pursuant to the full faith and credit clause, states typically recognize marriages 
performed in other states.  Thus, if Man (M) and Woman (W) marry in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and return to their home in New York City, the State of New York will recognize the 
marriage even though the marriage requirements in each of those states are different. 
Before Obergefell, the question was this:  If Man (M) and Man (M) married in New 
York, a state that permitted same-sex marriage, and returned to Texas, a state that did 
not recognize gay marriages, would Texas need to recognize the marriage under the 
full faith and credit clause?  Before Obegefell, some states in which same-sex marriages 
were not permitted refused to recognize gay marriages lawfully performed in other 
states by invoking a narrow public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause.112 
The Supreme Court described the notion of “[b]eing married in one State but 
having that valid marriage denied in another is one of the ‘most perplexing and dis-
tressing complication[s]’ in the law of domestic relations,”113 finding that such a system 
would promote “instability and uncertainty.”114  
The question of whether a state would need to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed elsewhere would have been far more significant had the Court not ruled, as 
it did in Obergefell, that there was a right to marriage equality.  The Court recognized, 
as did the respondents, that “if States are required by the Constitution to issue marriage 
license to same-sex couples, the justifications for refusing to recognize those marriages 
performed elsewhere are undermined.”115  Accordingly, the Court held “that there is no 
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in 
another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”116 
111  Constitution of the United States. Article IV, section 1.
112  See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388, 418-19 (2014).  
113  Obergefell, slip op. at 27, quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 (1942) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
114  Obergefell, slip op. at 28.
115  Id.
116  Id.
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3.5.  The dissenting Opinions
The four most conservative Justices on the Court – Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito – each filed his own dissenting opinion.117   And each 
of these dissents was fierce in its own right.118
The dissents focused on a number of interrelated themes, most prominent 
among them (1) the Court’s flawed due process and equal protection analyses; (2) the 
proper role of the Court in our democratic system; (3) the nature of the institution of 
marriage; and (4) the proper role of the states in our federal system.
3.5.1. The Majority’s Flawed Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis
The dissenters heavily criticized the majority for its legal analysis.  As described 
above,119 the Court’s decision was based largely on a due process analysis, an analysis 
that the Chief Justice criticized as having “no basis in principle or tradition.”120
Stripped of its shiny rhetorical gloss, the majority’s argument is that the Due Process 
Clause gives same-sex couples a fundamental right to marry because it will be good for 
them and for society. If I were a legislator, I would certainly consider that view as a matter 
of social policy. But as a judge, I find the majority’s position indefensible as a matter of 
constitutional law.121
Comparing the majority opinion to long-discredited decisions of the Supreme 
Court, the Chief Justice accuses the majority of embracing an “aggressive application 
of substantive due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns the 
Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.”122
The dissenters also critiqued the majority’s equal protection discussion.  The 
principal dissent accuses the majority of “not seriously engag[ing]”123 the equal pro-
tection claim and attacking the Court’s treatment of the equal protection issue as 
117  Chief Justice Robert’s dissent was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas; Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined 
by Justice Thomas; Justice Thomas’s dissent was joined by Justice Scalia; and Justice Alito’s dissent was joined 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
118  The dissent of the Chief Justice has been described as “undoubtedly the fieriest opinion the chief justice 
has written on the court.”  ROSEN, Jeffrey. John Roberts, the Umpire in Chief, Sunday Review. The new York 
Times (June 27, 2015), available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/john-roberts-the-umpire
-in-chief.html>.
119  See Part 3.4.2., supra.
120  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Roberts, C.J., slip op. at 10.
121  Id. 
122  Id. at 15.
123  Id. at 23.
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“conclusory”124 and “difficult to follow.”125  The Chief Justice further assails the majority 
for ignoring the Court’s established framework for analyzing equal protection claims,126 
relying instead on the vague notion of a “’synergy between’”127 the due process and 
equal protection clauses.  The majority, he claims, “fails to provide even a single sen-
tence explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its 
position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against un-
necessarily resolving constitutional questions.”128
As summarized by Justice Scalia in his separate dissent:
[T]he opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly incoherent. …What possible 
“essence” does substantive due process “capture” in an “accurate and comprehensive 
way”?  It stands for nothing whatever, except those freedoms and entitlements that this 
Court really likes. And the Equal Protection Clause, as employed today, identifies noth-
ing except a difference in treatment that this Court really dislikes. … The stuff contained 
in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s reputation for clear thinking and sober 
analysis.129
And Justice Thomas said this:
The Court’s decision today is at odds not only with the Constitution, but with the prin-
ciples upon which our Nation was built.  Since well before 1787, liberty has been under-
stood as freedom from government action, not entitlement to government benefits. 
The Framers created our Constitution to preserve that understanding of liberty. Yet the 
majority invokes our Constitution in the name of a “liberty” that the Framers would not 
have recognized, to the detriment of the liberty they sought to protect.  Along the way, 
it rejects the idea—captured in our Declaration of Independence—that human dignity 
is innate and suggests instead that it comes from the Government. This distortion of our 
Constitution not only ignores the text, it inverts the relationship between the individual 





128  Id. at 24.
129  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, slip op. at 9.
130  Obergfell, dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas, slip op. at 2.
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3.5.2. The Court’s Role in our Democratic System
The dissenters made a potent charge that the Court usurped its proper role in 
the political process and did serious damage to its institutional integrity.  Taking pains 
to note that his dissent was not based on opposition to same-sex marriage as a matter 
of social policy (stating that notions of “social policy and considerations of fairness” lent 
“undeniable appeal” to legislative decisions to allow marriage equality131), Chief Justice 
Roberts stressed that the decision was one for the democratic branches rather than the 
judicial branch:
[T]his Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of 
no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not 
what it should be…..
Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be 
compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamen-
tal right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of mar-
riage. ….132
Reiterating that he holds no animus toward gays and lesbians, the Chief Justice 
emphasized that his position was informed by the proper position of the Court in our 
constitutional system:
Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my judgment, 
the institution of marriage should be changed to include same-sex couples. It is instead 
about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people act-
ing through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold com-
missions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes according to law. The Constitution 
leaves no doubt about the answer.133
And he continued:
In the face of all this, a much different view of the Court’s role is possible. That view is 
more modest and restrained. It is more skeptical that the legal abilities of judges also 
reflect insight into moral and philosophical issues. It is more sensitive to the fact that 
judges are unelected and unaccountable, and that the legitimacy of their power de-
pends on confining it to the exercise of legal judgment. It is more attuned to the lessons 
of history, and what it has meant for the country and Court when Justices have exceeded 
131  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, slip op.at 1.
132  Id. at 2.
133  Id. at 3.
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their proper bounds. And it is less pretentious than to suppose that while people around 
the world have viewed an institution in a particular way for thousands of years, the pres-
ent generation and the present Court are the ones chosen to burst the bonds of that his-
tory and tradition.134
The dissenters were particularly troubled by the lack of restraint of the majority:
The majority today neglects that restrained conception of the judicial role. It seizes for 
itself a question the Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when the people are 
engaged in a vibrant debate on that question. And it answers that question based not on 
neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own “understanding of what freedom 
is and must become.”135
The dissent also criticized the Court’s decision for thwarting the democratic pro-
cess that was moving, and moving quickly, in support of permitting same-sex marriage 
and predicted that negative consequences for the acceptance of gay people and gay 
marriage would result:  
Supporters of same-sex marriage have achieved considerable success persuading their 
fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today. 
Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a mat-
ter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the people will for many cast a cloud 
over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that much more difficult to 
accept.136
And this:
By deciding this question under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of 
democratic decision. There will be consequences to shutting down the political process 
on an issue of such profound public significance. Closing debate tends to close minds. 
People denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does 
not seem to be the sort of thing courts usually decide…. Indeed, however heartened the 
proponents of same-sex marriage might be on this day, it is worth acknowledging what 
they have lost, and lost forever: the opportunity to win the true acceptance that comes 
from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause. And they lose this just 
when the winds of change were freshening at their backs.137
134  Id. at 29.
135  Id. at 3.
136  Id. at 2.
137  Id. at 26-27.  Justice Thomas agreed, claiming that the majority “wip[es] out with a stroke of the keyboard 
the results of the political process in over 30 States.”  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas, at 3.
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The dissent also condemns the majority opinion for compromising the Court’s 
legitimacy.  Respect for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts said, “flows from the percep-
tion—and reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases according 
to the Constitution and law. The role of the Court envisioned by the majority today, 
however, is anything but humble or restrained.”138
As Justice Scalia added:
This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always ac-
companied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most 
important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revo-
lution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.
* * * *
[T]o allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by 
a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even 
more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation 
without representation.139
Justice Alito also expressed concern about the institutional role of the Court and 
what the decision portends for future cases:
Today’s decision will also have a fundamental effect on this Court and its ability to up-
hold the rule of law. If a bare majority of Justices can invent a new right and impose that 
right on the rest of the country, the only real limit on what future majorities will be able to 
do is their own sense of what those with political power and cultural influence are willing 
to tolerate. Even enthusiastic supporters of same-sex marriage should worry about the 
scope of the power that today’s majority claims.
Today’s decision shows that decades of attempts to restrain this Court’s abuse of its 
authority have failed. A lesson that some will take from today’s decision is that preach-
ing about the proper method of interpreting the Constitution or the virtues of judicial 
138  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, slip op. at 24.
139  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, slip op. at 6.  Justice Alito agreed: 
To prevent five unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon the American people, 
the Court has held that “liberty” under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only those 
rights that are “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720–721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). And it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage 
is not among those rights.
* * * *
For today’s majority, it does not matter that the right to same-sex marriage lacks deep roots or even that it is 
contrary to long-established tradition. The Justices in the majority claim the authority to confer constitutional 
protection upon that right simply because they believe that it is fundamental.
Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, slip op. at 2-3.
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self-restraint and humility cannot compete with the temptation to achieve what is 
viewed as a noble end by any practicable means. I do not doubt that my colleagues in 
the majority sincerely see in the Constitution a vision of liberty that happens to coincide 
with their own. But this sincerity is cause for concern, not comfort. What it evidences is 
the deep and perhaps irremediable corruption of our legal culture’s conception of consti-
tutional interpretation.140
3.5.3. The Nature of the Institution of Marriage
One of the central differences between arguments made by petitioners and 
respondents in Obergefell – and between those on opposite sides of the marriage de-
bate more generally – is whether same-sex marriage is simply an extension of the well-
recognized institution or fundamentally changes long-held notions of marriage.  This 
debate was recognized by the majority, which characterized same-sex marriage as an 
extension of traditional marriage.141
The dissenters, however, strenuously assert that same-sex marriage fundamen-
tally alters the institution of marriage.  Marriage, which has existed for millennia and 
across civilizations, has “referred to only one relationship: the union of a man and a 
woman.”142  This historical understanding of marriage, the Chief Justice, continued, “is 
no historical coincidence” but “arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need: ensur-
ing that children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them in 
the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship…. This singular understanding of mar-
riage has prevailed in the United States throughout our history.”143
The premises supporting this concept of marriage are so fundamental that they 
rarely require articulation. The human race must procreate to survive. Procreation oc-
curs through sexual relations between a man and a woman. When sexual relations re-
sult in the conception of a child, that child’s prospects are generally better if the mother 
and father stay together rather than going their separate ways. Therefore, for the good 
of children and society, sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only 
between a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond.
Society has recognized that bond as marriage. 144 
The Court itself in its cases has described marriage as the union of one man and 
one woman and, despite the rapid pace of societal change, most states had retained 
that traditional understanding of marriage.  And, as Justice Alito stated:
140  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, slip op. at 8.
141  Obergefell, slip op. at 18.
142  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Roberts, C.J., slip op. at 4.
143  Id. at 5.
144  Id. at 5.
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For millennia, marriage was inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-
sex couple can do: procreate. 
* * * *
It is far beyond the outer reaches of this Court’s authority to say that a State may not 
adhere to the understanding of marriage that has long prevailed, not just in this country 
and others with similar cultural roots, but also in a great variety of countries and cultures 
all around the globe.145
3.5.4. The Proper Role of the States in our Federal System
The dissenters attack the Court’s opinion for making federal what in their view is 
properly an issue for the states.  Marriage, the dissenters said, had historically been the 
province of the states, citing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor from just two years 
prior:  “’[R]egulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a 
virtually exclusive province of the States…. [T]he Federal Government, through our his-
tory, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.’”146 
As Justice Alito stated in his dissent:
The system of federalism established by our Constitution provides a way for people with 
different beliefs to live together in a single nation. If the issue of same-sex marriage had 
been left to the people of the States, it is likely that some States would recognize same-
sex marriage and others would not. It is also possible that some States would tie recogni-
tion to protection for conscience rights. The majority today makes that impossible.147
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent ended with a strongly worded rebuke to the insti-
tutional integrity of the majority’s decision:
If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who favor 
expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the 
achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of com-
mitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the 
Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.148
145  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, slip op. 4, 5. 
146  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013), quoted in Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice 
Scalia, slip op. 4.
147  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, slip op. at 7.
148  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, slip op. at 29.
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4. ReFleCTIOnS On ObErgEfEll
So what does it all mean?  In creating a right to same-sex marriage thought the 
nation, the Court’s decision in Obergefell has set off a spate of discussion and anticipa-
tion about the future of gay rights and marriage in the United States.  This part makes 
some modest reflections on the decision.
4.1.  The Court’s Missed Opportunity to Solidify its equal Protection 
Jurisprudence
Many commentators have argued that the Court lost what could have been a 
valuable opportunity to clarify its equal protection jurisprudence and provide even 
greater protection to homosexuals.149   As Professor Clare Huntington argued, an equal 
protection analysis would have provided gay men and lesbians with a greater panoply 
of protections.150  This “squandered” opportunity of failing to declare sexual orientation 
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification for purposes of an equal protection analysis 
potentially limits the reach of Obergefell.  An opinion based more directly on equal pro-
tection grounds “would secure an enduring precedent that would bind lower courts – 
and within the bounds of stare decisis, Justice Kennedy’s successors – when future laws 
targeting gays and lesbians are challenged.”151  A few of these potential ramifications 
are described below:
[T]he failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification creates future harm–
in the form of continued legal uncertainty for gays and lesbians. Consider first current 
or future laws restricting the ability of gays and lesbians to legally adopt children. Be-
cause  Obergefell  was laser focused on the fundamental right to marry and not the 
nature of the classification, and because the Court noted, without casting doubt on its 
constitutionality, that some states do not permit gays and lesbians to adopt children, 
future courts can easily distinguish Obergefell. Consider, as a second example, the use 
of peremptory challenges to strike jurors. Where a peremptory challenge implicates a 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification, such as race or sex, the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the exercise of that challenge on that ground. Such a protection does not apply 
149  “Many commentators … expressed significant frustration that the Court did not use Obergefell to clarify the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, particularly regarding the tiers of scrutiny.”  Elizabeth B. Cooper, The 
Power of Dignity, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 3, 5 n. 15 (2015).  See also id. at 13 (“Many commentators have criticized 
the Obergefell Court for failing to address directly the claimant’s equal protection arguments, with much of 
this criticism focusing on the Court’s sidestepping the question of whether gay men and lesbians should be 
treated as a protected class”).
150  HUNTINGTON, Clare. Obergefell’s Conservatism:  Reifying Familial Fronts. Fordham law Review, New York 
City, vol. 84, n. 1, p. 23-31, oct. 2015. p. 23.
151  NICOLAS, Peter. Obergefell’s Squandered Potential. California law Review Circuit, Berkeley, vol. 6, p. 137-
144, nov. 2015. p. 138.
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to non-suspect grounds.  Thus, it is only if heightened scrutiny applies to sexual orienta-
tion that litigants may prevent opposing counsel from striking people from juries solely 
on the basis of their sexual orientation.152
Other potential issues that may arise beyond adoption153 and the use of peremp-
tory strikes to exclude gay individuals from a jury include those relating to real property, 
child custody, spousal support, employment, housing, and public accommodations.154
One noted commentator summarized criticism of the Court’s decision as being 
“heavy on rhetoric and light on legal reasoning – a political masterstroke but a doctrinal 
dud.”155
4.2.  Obergefell’s Fundamentally Conservative Vision of Marriage
In some respects, of course, the Obergefell decision reflects a dramatic departure 
from the past and a progressive response to societal transformations.  In other ways, 
however, the Court’s decision has been viewed as fundamentally conservative, hav-
ing been described as a “paean to a very traditional picture of marriage.”156  Indeed, as 
many marriage-equality proponents had warned, “the price of admission to marriage 
for same-sex couples was the further reinforcement of a very traditional understand-
ing of marriage and its role in society.”157  As another scholar noted, the decision has 
the “lamentable consequence[]” of “unnecessarily disrespect[ing] people who in good 
faith have a different view of the social front of marriage.  And it reifies marriage as a 
key element in the social front of family, further marginalizing nonmarital families”158 
and single individuals.  The Court’s emphasis on the notion of dignity in marriage cel-
ebrates the union over the notion of individual dignity that has characterized much of 
the Court’s earlier rulings.  This characterization has been said to “obscure[] the dignity 
152  Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
153  See also LEWIN, Tamar. Mississippi Ban on Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples Is Challenged. The new York Ti-
mes (August 12, 2015), available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/mississippi-ban-on-adoptions-
same-sex-couples-challenged.html>.
154  See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 149 at 18-19, 20-21; Huntington, supra note 150 at 23 n. 4.  
155  TRIBE, Laurence H. Equal Dignity:  Speaking its Name. harvard law Review, New Haven, vol. 129, n. 1, p. 
16-32. nov. 2015. p. 16.  An even more caustic response, somewhat predictably, came from Justice Scalia, who 
said this:
If … I ever joined an opinion for the Court that began: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, 
a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express 
their identity,” I would hide my head in a bag.  The Supreme Court of the United States has descended from the 
disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.
Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, slip op. at 7-8 n. 22.
156  LEIB, Ethan J. Hail Marriage and Farewell. Fordham law Review, New York City, vol. 84, n. 1, p. 41-52, oct. 
2015. p. 41.  
157  Id. (footnote omitted).
158  Huntington, supra note 150 at 23 (footnote omitted).
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of the individual, whether married or not…..  It overlooks – and even implicitly un-
dermines – the importance of individual autonomy and the importance of solitude in 
defining and refining individual autonomy.”159
4.3.  The Open Question of Religious accommodation
The majority recognized that there is an inherent tension between the consti-
tutional right to marriage equality recognized in Obergefell and the First Amendment’s 
protection of free exercise of religion.160  As Justice Kennedy acknowledged, “[t]he First 
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper pro-
tection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their 
lives and faiths.”161  The majority decision, consistent with its general approach to deal 
with constitutional issues only when they arise in concrete cases,162 did not outline the 
specific ways in which the inevitable conflicts between the free exercise clause and the 
right to marry would be resolved.  
The Chief Justice in his dissent anticipated some of the many thorny issues in-
volving this conflict:
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to 
conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage – when, for example, a religious college 
provides married student housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious 
adoption agency declines to place children with same sex married couples.163
And he further projected that those hoping to preserve their right to free exer-
cise of religion in such cases would not be received favorably when these cases reach 
the Court: “There is little doubt that these and similar questions will soon be before the 
Court.  Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive 
from the majority today.”164
These cases surely will arise in the coming years and it will remain to be seen 
how the Court will resolve the tension between these two important rights.
159  POWELL, Catherine. Up from Marriage:  Freedom, Solitude, and Individual Autonomy in the Shadow of 
Marriage Equality. Fordham law Review, New York City, vol. 84, n. 1, p. 69-78, oct. 2015. p. 71-72.
160  Congress shall make no law…  prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”  Constitution of the United States, 
Amendment 1.
161  Obergefell, slip op. at 27.
162  See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57-68 (1993).
163  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, slip op. at 28.
164  Id.  See also Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas, slip op. at 14-16.
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4.4.  Moderate Backlash
Although the Obergefell decision has received “widespread acceptance,”165 there 
has been a moderate backlash, as predicted by the dissenters, with at least one poll 
suggesting that support for gay marriage has fallen since the Court’s ruling.166
Implementation of the Obergefell decision has been robust; in the vast major-
ity of states impacted by the Court’s decision, there has been full compliance with 
Obergefell.167
Nevertheless, some county clerks and others have refused to issue marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples or altogether.168  In one particularly notorious case, a Ken-
tucky clerk was jailed for her refusal to issue marriage licenses to gay couples.169  All in 
all, there is no serious concern about full implementation of Obergefell at the state and 
local level.
4.5.  Is Polygamy next?
The Chief Justice in his dissent predicted that the Court’s affirmation of a consti-
tutional right to same-sex marriage will be used to argue that there is also a constitu-
tional right to polygamous marriages:
It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal force to the 
claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage. If “[t]here is dignity in the bond between 
two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound 
choices,” ante, at 2599, why would there be any less dignity in the bond between three 
people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound choice to marry? 
If a same-sex couple has the constitutional right to marry because their children would 
otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser,” ante, at 2600, 
why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising 
children? If not having the opportunity to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” 
gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” ante, at 
2604, serve to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous 
165  GOLDBERG, Suzanne B. Obergefell at the Intersection of Civil Rights and Social Movements. California law 
Review Circuit, Berkeley, vol. 6, p. 157-165, nov. 2015. p. 157.
166  See http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/07/19/poll-support-for-gay-marriage-has-fallen-af-
ter-obergefell/.
167  LANDAU, Joseph. Roberts, Kennedy, and the Subtle Differences that Matter in Obergefell. Fordham law 
Review, New York City, vol. 84, n. 1, p. 33-40, oct. 2015. p. 39 note 46.
168  See Illegal Defiance on Same-Sex Marriage, The Opinion Page, New York Times, July 10, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/opinion/illegal-defiance-on-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0.
169  See BLINDER, Alan; PEREZ-PENA, Richard. Kim Davis, Released from Kentucky Jail, Won’t Say if She Will Keep 
Defying Court. new York Times (September 8, 2015), available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/us/
kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html>.
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relationships? See Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution? Newsweek, July 28, 
2009 (estimating 500,000 polyamorous families in the United States); Li, Married Lesbian 
“Throuple” Expecting First Child, N.Y. Post, Apr. 23, 2014; Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: 
The Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 Emory L.J. 1977 (2015).
I do not mean to equate marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriages in 
all respects. There may well be relevant differences that compel different legal analysis. 
But if there are, petitioners have not pointed to any. When asked about a plural marital 
union at oral argument, petitioners asserted that a State “doesn’t have such an institu-
tion.” Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 2, p. 6. But that is exactly the point: the States at issue 
here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage, either.170
The concern that polygamous couples would use Obergefell as supporting 
a right to plural marriage is not merely hypothetical but has already occurred.171  Al-
though the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century ruled that polygamy could be a 
crime,172a number of commentators have argued that Obergefell provides new support 
for overturning that decision.173  This is unlikely but the decision does give cause for 
reflection on the essential nature of our understanding of marriage.
4.6.  Is there a Right to Marriage or a Right to Marriage equality?
It has been argued that in establishing a constitutional right of same-sex cou-
ples to marry, the Supreme Court did not really find a constitutional right to marriage 
but instead a constitutional right to marriage equality.  As Professor Ethan Leib sug-
gested, it may be constitutionally permissible after Obergefell for a state to remove itself 
from the business of marriage:
Still, there is an important question that remains open after Obergefell.  Although no 
one can doubt that same-sex couples now have a fundamental right to marry if and 
when the state offers marriage at all, one might wonder whether Justice Kennedy actu-
ally created not just a right to marry, but also a right to marriage itself.  To wit, is it an 
outgrowth of the Court’s opinion that there is a constitutional requirement that states 
170  Obergefell, dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, slip op. at 21.
171  See http://www.krtv.com/story/30715777/montana-polygamist-family-lawsuit-hits-legal-roadblock, invol-
ving the notorious polygamist Nathan Collier.
172  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
173  See, e.g., BAUDE, William. Is Polygamy Next? The new York Times, The Opinion Pages (July 21, 2015), availa-
ble at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/opinion/is-polygamy-next.html>. Asking “”[i]f there is no magic 
power in opposite sexes when it comes to marriage, is there any magic power in the number two?”.
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provide marriage and issue licenses?  May states look for ways to pull themselves away 
from endorsing marriage at all?174
Professor Leib takes the position that the Court in Obergefell “ultimately comes 
shy of establishing … a fundamental right to marriage,”175 and details arguments made 
my politicians and efforts in various states to reduce public involvement in conferring 
marital status.176
5. COnClUSIOn
The Court’s decision in Obergefell is a watershed moment for those who favor 
gay rights and the dignity of gay individuals and other minorities.  It has been widely 
and warmly received by many and vilified by others.  It leaves open numerous ques-
tions and, while it goes a long way in protecting the rights of gay people in the United 
States, it does not give them the full range of protections that the gay rights movement 
has sought.
The Obergefell case brings to mind another landmark in the Court’s jurispru-
dence:  Brown v. Board of Education,177 in which the Court overruled longstanding prec-
edent and ruled that the segregation of schoolchildren on the basis of race violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.  That decision, too, set off a firestorm of dis-
approval from those who favored the position of power that segregation had bestowed 
upon the white majority.  Although Brown itself did not end de facto discrimination, or 
the diminished status of African Americans in the minds of many, it was a turning point 
in the civil rights movement.  Obergefell, too, has made a bold and progressive state-
ment about the role of homosexuals in our society by finding a constitutional right 
to one of its most cherished and venerable institutions.  Brown had the advantage of 
being decided per curiam by a unanimous Court whereas Obergefell is the product of 
a closely and deeply divided Court.  Still, Obergefell may have much the same impact 
as Brown as a watershed moment in greater acceptance of a historically marginalized 
group; its legacy promises great things; its full potential remains to be seen.
174  Leib, supra note 156 at 41-42 (2015) (footnote omitted).
175  Id.at 43 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
176  Id. at 45-51.
177  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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